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What does it mean to bring these three terms  - class, culture, identity – 
together? What can such a juxtaposition do in terms of adding to an 
analysis of each of the terms?  Historically, theoretical analyses of class 
developed separately from analyses of either culture or identity.  
However, in considering these three terms in juxtaposition – or indeed in 
tension – the diverse contributions to this special issue share a number of 
features. 
 
First, and perhaps most obviously, in the face of  widespread 
political and theoretical proclamations of ‘the end of class’  the articles 
here argue for the continuing significance of class as a means of 
analysing forms of inequality.  Secondly, they consider class inequality 
not simply as a matter of economic inequality but also as circulating 
through symbolic and cultural forms – through, for example, the means 
through which people become judged as morally worthwhile, or as having 
the right kind of knowledge or ‘taste’. Third, and following from this, the 
contributors also conceptualize class as dynamic: as a system of 
inequality which is continually being re-made in the large- and small-scale 
processes of social life: through the workings of global capital and the 
search for new markets, but also through claims for entitlement (and of  
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non-entitlement), through symbols and representations, and in the 
emotional and affective dimensions of life.   
 
This dynamic character of class is related to classed identities, so 
that class is understood, not as a set of ‘empty’ signifiers (employment, 
housing, etc) waiting to be filled by interchangeable social actors, but as 
also something we are.  Hence, a challenge is mounted to the dichotomy 
between social system and social actor.  As Mariam Fraser puts it, ‘[C]lass 
inequalities, which might be thought of as 'large scale' issues of social 
and economic justice (or injustice), give rise to 'real' social effects, one of 
which is classed subjectivities’ (Fraser, 1999: 120).  In what follows, and 
by way of introduction to this issue, I will say a little about each of these 
themes in turn.  My focus will be on the UK, but most of the analysis has 
a broader geographical application. 
 
A classless society? 
Contemporary British culture could be said to have an ambiguous 
relationship to social class.  On the one hand, several commentators in 
the academic and political fields have announced the death of class, as 
class comes to be seen as no longer useful as a category of analysis, or 
even to have disappeared altogether.   An increasing emphasis on 
plasticity and self-fashioning means that class, seen as a matter of old, 
ascriptive ties, is often literally written out of the argument.   On the 
other hand, politically, class is invoked in moves to draw young people 
from 'deprived' areas into Higher Education while their younger siblings 
are brought into Sure Start programmes and their parents are encouraged 
or required to learn 'parenting skills'.   
 
Both politically and theoretically, then, class has become a 
contentious issue. Politicians on both Left and Right have proclaimed ‘the 
 3 
end of class’, with many social theorists rushing to agree.  Changes in 
industrial and political organization, property ownership, etc. have been 
held to signal the end of class, and classed identities are often held to 
have disappeared in the face of ‘new’ categories of political organization 
– particularly gender, ‘race’, sexuality and nationalism 
 
Such a depiction, however, relies on an overly monolithic historical 
model of class and an occlusion of other axes of identity and inequality 
before the last 20 or so years.  It also relies on a curiously additive model 
of identity (as if  one can only have one identity at a time) and obscures 
contemporary dimensions of classed inequality1.  As Hout et al argue: 
Class was always only one source of political identity and action 
alongside race, religion, nationality, gender and others.  To say 
class matters less now than it used to requires that one exaggerate 
its importance in the past and understate its importance at present 
(Hout et al, 1996: 56). 
 
 
In the UK, political claims to classlessness, intensifying in the 
1980s and 1990s, were never about the ‘abolition’ of classes, but alluded 
to an appeal to meritocratic principles by which class could be 
transcended.  Hence class is built into the idea of classlessness and 
claims of a classless society are the opposite of what is (apparently) 
claimed (Adonis and Pollard, 1997). 
 
One particularly insidious effect of claims of classlessness is that, 
when class is linguistically expunged, it cannot be invoked as an 
explanation for inequality.  As a result, people on the losing end of a 
classed system can increasingly be blamed.  In other words, the social-
structural dimensions of class inequality are now understood as being 
 4 
embedded only in the subjectivities of social actors.  Explanations for 
inequality come to inhere within the subjectivities of persons who are 
then marked as ‘wrong’ or ‘right’, ‘deficient’ or ‘acceptable’.  One effect 
of this is that when people do not surmount class barriers, they can be 
positioned as lacking in some way.  We might see the ‘gentler’ version of 
this in discourses of ‘social exclusion’ and the ‘harsher’ version in right-
wing forms of ‘underclass’ rhetoric.  Across the spectrum, however, 
political interventions tend to assume that the problem of class is a 
problem of getting working-class people to be more like their middle-
class counterparts.  The language of psychology has come to replace a 
grammar of exploitation (Walkerdine, 2003).  This, as I’ll explore below, 
makes attention to issues of identity (conferred identity, as well as felt or 
experienced subjectivity or self-identification) all the more pressing. 
 
  
Class and culture: recognition and redistribution 
 
Taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier (Bourdieu, 1986: 6). 
 
 
Conventionally, class has been  theorized in terms of Gessellschaft-lich  
interests rather than shared meanings or cultures (Lash, 1994), and 
classed identities have been deemed either irrelevant or epiphenomenal 
to understanding social class.    At the same time, analyses of culture and 
especially of identity have tended to ignore class and, in capitalist 
societies at least, class is rarely institutionalized as an identity around 
which ‘identity politics’ can be forged.  This dichotomy has been analysed 
by Nancy Fraser (2001) in terms of a rift between a politics based on 
redistribution (of material and cultural resources) and a politics based on 
recognition (of group identities).  This split is mirrored within much social 
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theory, within which inequalities are seen as deriving either from material 
or cultural mal-distribution (in which case identities are not 
problematized) or from a failure on the part of those whose identities are 
normalized to 'recognize' either the instability of their own identity or the 
legitimacy of others (in which case conventional issues of redistribution 
come to be seen as irrelevant or even as naïve).  Hence Beck, for example, 
can argue: 
 
It is very difficult to work in a rich empirical way with class 
categories. You can only develop them on an objective income 
basis, or on structures of work and employment. You cannot relate 
them to how people live and think, eat, how they dress, love, 
organize their lives and so on. If you are interested in what is going 
on in people’s minds, and the kinds of life they are leading, you 
have to get away from the old categories (Beck, 2000: 43). 
 
But he can only argue this by considering class only in terms of an 
‘objective’ and externalized system: issues of culture and identity are 
ruled out by fiat.     
 
For Fraser, however, recognition and redistribution are inseparable: 
indeed, issues of distribution may hinge on issues of recognition.  This is 
because social actors may be denied the status of full players in 
questions of distributive justice because they (are held to) belong to 
groups that are not recognized as having a parity with those other, 
normalized groups to whom material and symbolic goods are deemed to 
rightfully accrue.  Hence, a failure of recognition - misrecognition - of 
certain groups matters because it is unjust, not because it (necessarily) 
involves psychic harm or distorts an intrinsic 'human nature', but because  
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'it constitutes a form of institutionalized subordination - and thus, a 
serious violation of justice' (Fraser, 2001: 26). 
 
For me, Fraser's argument about the inseparability of recognition 
and redistribution is compelling in the face of the kind of  
announcements of ‘the end of class’ discussed above: it is a way to 
negotiate the maze engendered by a simultaneous proclamation of ‘the 
death of class’ or the ‘classless society’, and a constant invocation of 
classed signs and symbols. In the UK, recent attention given to ‘chavs’ 
(see, for example, chavscum.com) is just one manifestation of a  
widespread disparagement of the poor and the dispossessed that claims 
to be ‘nothing to do with class’ even as it invokes classed distinctions at 
every turn. 
 
It is not that cultural signifiers of class are divorced from economic 
systems (though, as Bourdieu reminds us, there is more than one way of 
making a 'profit').  Rather, the cultural and symbolic economy through 
which class (in part) signifies is not reducible to economic systems.  
Nevertheless, it is, with the important exception of the nouveau riche, 
those at the bottom of the economic system who are, in general, those 
also deemed lacking in - at the bottom of -  the cultural system.  What is 
significant, however, is that working-class people are not primarily 
marked as lacking and disgusting through their poverty, but through 
their assumed lack of knowledge and taste.  To be sure, they may be 
implicitly vilified through a suggestion that they are not spending their 
money properly - as in critiques that they are now the prey of a vacuous 
consumer culture - but this implied lack of thrift is in itself assumed to 
come from a lack of knowledge and taste which would, presumably, 
enable them to 'see through' consumerism.  Further, such cultural and 
symbolic meanings may effect material inequalities, as the groups come 
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to be blamed for their own domination: if people are not recognized as 
being legitimate social actors with legitimate claims, why should those 
claims be listened to? 
 
 
In this context, we can see class being configured in terms of a set 
of personal characteristics.  In a process of 'causality transference' 
(Bromley, 2000: 51), class becomes named in terms of its (assumed) 
symptoms.  Social inequality is magically transformed into individual 
pathology and the problem of a classed society becomes the 'problem' of 
working-class people.  Such a transference can have the effect of erasing 
class as a system of inequality at all.  It also has the effect of foreclosing 
any problematization or discussion of a middle-class position.   
 
This is crystallized in a recent newspaper article, in which taste is 
used both to signify and to erase class. Euan Ferguson, having asserted 
that '[Class] labels are irrelevant, confusing and foster stereotypes, when 
there are few things less important now than class', claims that his 
thoughts were 'untainted by class-consciousness when he writes:  
 
[W]e should be allowed our own thoughts on taste, which is not to 
be confused with class.  So I'll continue to look down on Mondeos, 
and best-of classical collections.  On air-fresheners, 
Poundstretchers, Harrods and royalty.  On people who talk with 
their mouths full, and gold taps, and people who are rude to 
waiters, and on sneery waiters; on cheap garden gnomes and on 
expensive chandeliers (Ferguson, 25.08.2002.  Emphasis his)2. 
 
Of course, and as discussed above, there is nothing new about the 
'class no longer matters' argument, and similar arguments are frequently 
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made about other systems of inequality such as gender and 'race'.  What 
is interesting about this piece is the way in which taste becomes both 
dissociated from, and a displacement of, class. Taste may not be 
determined by class, but it is used to mark class: in representations such 
as this, it is used to both invoke and to occlude class.  In this schema, 
such class marking becomes respectable because (middle-class) 'taste' is 
constituted as a personal characteristic which is desirable (everyone 
ought to 'have' it) and attainable (everyone could 'have' it), at the same 
time as it is a scarce resource (not everyone does 'have' it).  
 
The implicit 'ought' is important here: if bourgeois taste is not only 
desirable but imperative, then those who are seen to lack such taste are 
to be blamed. This applies to both the aristocracy and the working class, 
echoing the Kantian distinction  between 'the Court' and 'the people'.   
This has important implications: if class is constituted as a set of 
characteristics for which people can be blamed (or praised) then the 
kinds of evaluations of moral worth which class invokes can be seen as 
wholly legitimate.  This is especially so since there is a whole tradition 
which would regard culture as transcending class3 
 
More broadly, considering class in terms of culture leads us to 
issues of pleasure as well as pain and it is here that issues of recognition 
of the value of working-class existence in the face of a normalized and 
normative middle-class hold on the properly ‘cultural’ and the properly 
‘tasteful’.  Like Bourdieu, Regina Gagnier comments that ‘pleasure is not 
transitive across class’ and continues: 
Taste – or class as culture may disincline middle-class people to 
share anything but political solidarity and economic resources with 
the working class.  Put differently, a good leftist will willingly share 
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the pains of working people, willingly distribute the wealth, but will 
she share in their pleasures? (39-40.  Emphasis hers). 
 
 
 
 
 
Class, culture, identity 
 
No doubt much of a contemporary focus on class in cultural terms is part 
of a broader ‘cultural turn’ (Chaney, 1994) which has been celebrated by 
some and decried by others.  Some of this emphasis, in relation to class, 
can be seen as part of the continuing influence of the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu who, probably more than any other sociologist, has argued for 
an attention to the cultural, symbolic and identity-forming aspects of 
social class.  This work has undoubtedly been important and significant 
and several of the contributors to this issue are thinking ‘with and 
against Bourdieu’.  But what is also significant (and less often noted) is 
the work done by feminist class theorists in ‘bringing class home’ as Hey 
(2003) puts it and in demonstrating the ways in which we are positioned 
as classed subjects long before we ever enter employment.  Hey argues: 
 
a focus on the qualitative dimensions to class experience brings 
into question ‘traditional’ class theory through a feminist logic of 
connecting the public and the private that refreshes our 
understanding about the subjective and positional aspects of 
economic relations. It ought to steer new questions of the personal 
and dispositional gendering of class. (Hey, 2003: 332) 
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Another (and related) influence, of course, has been a wider 
problematization and analysis of ‘identity’ itself – a topic that would 
require at least an article of its own.  It is worth reiterating, however, that 
the two traditions (analyses of class and analyses of identity) have 
developed separately so that the work of bringing them together has only 
come to be undertaken in a systematic way relatively recently, at least in 
anglophone social theory.  But if identity is seen as being in at least some 
aspects as socially produced, then it would be extraordinary to assume 
that class is not a part of its production. This has been analysed through 
Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus and also through feminist work on 
affective and psycho-social dimensions of class: both traditions consider 
how class is lived ‘on the pulse’ as Annette Kuhn (1995) puts it. 
 
In my view this work has been massively important in terms of 
moving on the debates around class.  However, it has tended to focus, 
perhaps understandably, on working-class identities, so that there is still 
relatively written which directly addresses how class produces middle-
class identities. However, the articles in this issue go some  way towards 
redressing this absence in their consideration of the relational circulation 
of classed identities across classes. 
 
It is important, also, to consider identity not just as something felt 
or experienced (what we might see as self-identification, or subjectivity) 
but as something conferred – something imposed on us irrespective of 
how we feel about ourselves.   Gagnier puts it neatly:  
 
Subjectivity in its deeper forms may also conflict with objectivity, 
where objectivity means the convergence of the opinions of others.  
I may feel like a king but I won’t be treated like one at the bank.  I 
may feel like a woman but if I walk like a man, talk like a man and 
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look like a man, I will for all practical purposes be a man (Gagnier, 
2000: 39). 
 
This raises the issue of whose opinion matters – who has access to 
forms of public representation, and whose voice will be heard and taken 
seriously.  There is a long tradition of representing working-class people 
as a ‘mass’ or a ‘mob’ against which middle-class individuality is 
asserted: but it’s doubtful that anyone identifies themselves as part of a 
mass or a mob. Similarly, though the term ‘chav/a’ now circulates widely 
in Britain as a term of disgust and contempt, it is imposed on people 
rather than being claimed by them4 
 
At the time of writing this Introduction, there is, in the UK, a 
furious political debate that illustrates this issue.  The debate is inspired 
by proposals made by Ruth Kelly, the UK’s Education Secretary, to 
lengthen the school day, providing after-hours activities for school 
children and childcare for working parents.  Commentators across the 
political spectrum have jostled for media space in praise or 
condemnation of so-called ‘Kelly hours’.  Supporters of the proposals 
have tended to focus on the cultural enrichment that ‘Kelly hours’ will 
provide for some (read ‘working-class’) children.  Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, 
for example, writes in The Independent: 
 
There are other impediments [than financial ones] to the prospects 
of the impoverished child that are harder to quantify and are 
politically sensitive. … Far too many children, living in low-income 
households, with stubborn social problems of drugs and crime, 
suffer material deprivation and a lack of emotional security and real 
communication with adults.  Their parents are themselves a volatile 
bundle of ignorance, desperation and ineptitude…. Think of what it 
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would mean if [these children] were enabled to escape the home 
and godawful TV for a good part of the day (Alibhai-Brown, 
13.06.2005). 
 
I certainly don’t want to single out Alibhai-Brown’s contribution as 
particularly odious: she is clearly against class inequality and arguing for 
its erasure, and this piece simply crystallizes the kind of concern that has 
pervaded large sections of the media for several years.  However, I quote 
it exactly to indicate the ways in which, even ‘left liberal’ commentators 
will cast class as a problem of working-class people’s behaviour and 
identities.  Class is being configured in terms of culture and identity, and 
‘damaged’ or ‘faulty’ identities are conferred on working-class people by 
middle-class observers.  The poor are vilified here, not explicitly for being 
poor, but for having the wrong kind of life (too much TV?) and the wrong 
kind of identity (ignorant, desperate and inept).  Note the slippage from 
poverty to criminality through the route of an assumed ignorance.  
Working-class culture is seen as the ‘point zero’ of culture (Skeggs, 
2004): a negative referent for its implicit or explicit other – middle-class 
culture, configured as real culture.  This latter is characterized not only 
by relative wealth but by intelligence, taste, good childcare practices and 
so on.  This is a middle-class politics that works without naming ‘class’ as 
a system.  It is a politics that homogenizes classes and hinges on the 
vilification of persons, communities and cultures .  And it is a politics that 
blames the victim and thus ‘disappears’ the victim, leaving only a villain 
(Hall, 2005). 
 
Pierre Bourdieu points to a wider significance of such 
characterizations when he argues: 
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The Anglo-American ideology … [historically] distinguished the 
'undeserving poor' … from the 'deserving poor' … Alongside or in 
place of this ethical justification there is now an intellectual 
justification.  The poor are  not just immoral, alcoholic and 
degenerate, they are stupid, they lack intelligence (Bourdieu, 1998: 
43). 
 
 
In fact the charge of intellectual degeneracy is hardly new: late 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century US 'family studies' characterized 
white working class families in terms of 'feeble-mindedness'5 (English, 
1999).  In the UK, eugenics was espoused by 'progressive' thinkers - part 
of the aim being to 'improve' the nation's genetic stock through 
restricting births to working-class families while encouraging the middle 
classes to breed.  And the 1960s community studies analysed by Ian 
Roberts (1999) repeatedly align poverty with stupidity. More broadly, it 
would be a mistake to see class as newly configured in terms of 
individual or familial pathology.  Orwell’s famous (and deliberately 
contentious) comment that the secret of class in the West is to be found 
in the words ‘the lower classes smell’  may not refer to stupidity but does 
refer to a whole culture and way of life that is constituted as repellent by 
the middle-class observer.  The point, for Orwell, was less a literal or 
metaphorical smell than a disgust that was bound up with classed 
identities  - both working-class and middle-class (Miller, 1997)6. 
 
As well as changes, then, it is possible to see stark continuities, 
especially if class is considered in dynamic and relational terms, as it is in 
the articles contained here.  Nevertheless, an intensification of 
individualism means class may be harder to see, though no less present. 
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Let me end by returning to the juxtaposition of the three terms – 
class, culture, identity.  The articles in this issue address the complexities 
of class when it is considered as more than simply an occupational or 
economic category, but is analysed as something which is done (in both 
‘public’ and ‘private’ arenas) rather than a system into which we are 
slotted.  Class is one axis around which identities and cultures are 
formed.  It does not exist apart from other axes – gender, race, nation, 
sexuality and so on – but then it never did. 
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1
 For Adonis and Pollard (1997), the belief that we are rid of the ties with the past is part of ‘the conceit of 
modernity’ with each generation believing itself to be less marked by the past than ever before.   
 
2
 I can only assume Ferguson is hoping to strike a demotic note in his sneering at the aristocracy as well as 
the working class.  But this does nothing to support his statement that his beliefs are nothing to do with 
class.  What is more, in his self-distinction from both the aristocracy and the working-class, he is 
continuing a long tradition in which the emergent bourgeoisie distinguished itself from both 'the people' 
and 'the Court' (Bourdieu, 1986).  This distinction was founded largely on the character traits, including the 
tastes, of the various groups.  Moreover, it hardly matters if Ferguson 'looks down on' royalty, but in a 
cultural economy in which working-class existence is continually rendered suspect and illegitimate, it does 
matter that he looks down on those who are already dominated across many registers.   
 
3
 As, for example, in Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy (1875). 
 
4
 Indeed I wonder whether anyone claims ‘chav/a’ as a form of identification.  But whether they do or not, 
being characterized as such certainly does not depend on self-identification. 
 
5
 And between 1907 and 1940, at least 70,000 US residents were sterilized under statutes that permitted the 
compulsory sterilization of those deemed ‘mentally unfit’ (English, 1999). 
 
6
 See Lawler (2005) for further discussion of this issue. 
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